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During the Survey period, Texas courts issued important decisions in
various professional liability actions. In the medical field, the Texas Su-
preme Court weighed in on the applicability of governmental immunity
to medical residents and continued to clarify the boundaries of what testi-
mony is sufficient to demonstrate causation. In the legal malpractice con-
text, courts also addressed an issue related to causation. Specifically, the
Texas Supreme Court offered guidance as to what does and what does
not satisfy the requirements to demonstrate an issue of material fact re-
garding causation at the summary judgment stage. Finally, during the Sur-
vey period, courts addressed a wide-ranging set of issues related to
director and officer liability, including the availability of constructive
trusts for breaches of fiduciary duty, the relationship between indemnity
and settlement agreements, and the standard for piercing the corporate
veil in reverse.
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY AND THE LIABILITY
OF MEDICAL RESIDENTS
Across the state of Texas, a number of medical residents work in clinics
or hospitals associated with governmental units. However, the nature of a
resident’s employment is not necessarily a cut and dry issue. During the
Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court addressed in Lenoir v. Marino
who constitutes an “employee” in this context and, particularly, how this
determination bears upon the invocation of governmental immunity.
While it is unclear at this date whether the ruling will have far-reaching
effects, the issues discussed, particularly in the margins of the case in
dicta, are worthy of note.
Shana Lenoir was between thirty-two and thirty-five weeks pregnant
with two unborn twins when she was scheduled to see her physician at the
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University of Texas Physicians Clinic in Houston.1 However, her physi-
cian was unavailable to provide prenatal care.2 In the physician’s absence,
a second-year medical resident, Dr. Leah Anne Gonski, attended to
Shana Lenoir.3 Dr. Gonski was a resident at the University of Texas Phy-
sicians Clinic in Houston, but in a program in obstetrics and gynecology
offered by the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston
(UTHSCH).4 During the visit, Shana Lenoir communicated to Dr. Gon-
ski that she had an earlier twin pregnancy with a preterm delivery that
resulted in serious complications, namely the extended hospitalization of
one twin and the death of the second child.5
At the conclusion of the appointment, Dr. Gonski ordered a progester-
one injection to be administered that day at the office and prescribed
weekly progesterone injections going forward.6 The assisting nurse ad-
ministered the injection, and Shana Lenoir left the office.7 Tragically, af-
ter several hours Shana started struggling to breathe, and emergency
assistance was called to take her to a hospital for care.8 Before arriving at
a hospital, Shana Lenoir and both of her unborn twins died.9
The father of Shana’s living child, Christopher McKnight, and Shana’s
mother, Shirley Lenoir (collectively, the Lenoirs), filed a medical mal-
practice lawsuit against the clinic, Dr. Gonski, the nurse who adminis-
tered the injection, and the attending physician who was overseeing Dr.
Gonski—Dr. Jaou-Chen Huang.10 In the 164th Judicial District Court,
Harris County, Dr. Gonski and Dr. Huang moved to be dismissed pursu-
ant to Tort Claims Act section 101.106(f), which states:
If a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on
conduct within the general scope of that employee’s employment
and if it could have been brought under this chapter against the gov-
ernmental unit, the suit is considered to be against the employee in
the employee’s official capacity only. On the employee’s motion, the
suit against the employee shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff files
amended pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the govern-
mental unit as defendant on or before the 30th day after the date the
motion is filed.11
The doctors presented argument and documents attempting to show they
were employees of governmental units. Dr. Gonski claimed she was an
employee of the University of Texas System Medical Foundation (the
1. See Lenoir v. Marino, 469 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015),
aff’d, 526 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. 2017).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Marino v. Lenoir, 526 S.W.3d 403, 404 (Tex. 2017).
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Foundation)—a nonprofit corporation that appointed her to the Univer-
sity of Texas Health Science Center’s residency program.12 Dr. Huang,
however, contended that he was an employee of UTHSCH and not the
Foundation.13 A hearing was held on the doctors’ motions; both were
granted, dismissing each doctor from the suit.14
The Lenoirs challenged these findings via an interlocutory appeal
which was taken up by the First Houston Court of Appeals.15 The court
of appeals overruled the challenge to Dr. Huang’s dismissal but sustained
the challenge to the dismissal of Dr. Gonski.16 Dr. Gonski appealed to
the Texas Supreme Court, which took up the question of whether dismis-
sal was appropriate.17
The key issue before the supreme court was whether Dr. Gonski quali-
fied as an employee of a governmental unit entitled to dismissal under
Section 101.106(f). The supreme court considered the definition of an
“employee” under the Tort Claims Act:
[A] person, including an officer or agent, who is in the paid service of
a governmental unit by competent authority, but does not include an
independent contractor, an agent or employee of an independent
contractor, or a person who performs tasks the details of which the
governmental unit does not have the legal right to control.18
Dr. Gonski presented evidence that she was in the paid service of the
Foundation, and the Lenoirs did not challenge this fact.19 However, the
definition of employee excludes individuals who perform tasks “the de-
tails of which the governmental unit does not have the legal right to
control.”20
The supreme court interpreted the definition of employee as referring
to a single governmental unit (“the” governmental unit). The relevance of
this is made clear when one considers the nature of Dr. Gonski’s resi-
dency: the Foundation paid Dr. Gonski, the Foundation appointed Dr.
Gonski through the residency program which is administered by the
Foundation, the Foundation provided malpractice insurance to residents,
and the Foundation required residents to abide by Foundation policies.21
However, the Foundation’s policies indicate that teaching staff supervise
the resident, and a Program Director and/or teaching staff determine the
level of responsibility assigned to each resident.22 The Foundation’s poli-




16. Id. at 687.
17. See Marino, 526 S.W.3d at 404.
18. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001(2) (West 2011).
19. See Marino, 526 S.W.3d at 406 n.8 (noting, additionally, that the supreme court did
not reach the issue of whether the Foundation was actually a governmental unit under the
Act).
20. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001(2) (West 2011) (emphasis added).
21. See Marino, 526 S.W.3d at 406.
22. Id.
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cies and bylaws, as well as other evidence, demonstrated that the Founda-
tion does not control the details of physicians’ tasks, such as Dr. Gonski’s,
as a medical resident when they work at hospitals not owned by the
Foundation.23
Dr. Pamela Promecene was the Program Director of the residency pro-
gram at UTHSCH.24 Dr. Promecene testified that she was a full-time em-
ployee of UTHSCH and not an employee of the Foundation.25 There was
no evidence the Foundation owned or staffed the clinic in which Shana
was treated, but rather evidence indicated that the clinic was an internal
site of UTHSCH.26
Dr. Gonski did note that one provision contained within the Graduate
Medical Education Resident Handbook (to which the Foundation re-
quires residents’ compliance) reserved the right of the Foundation to
change requirements affecting terms and conditions of the residents’ em-
ployment.27 The supreme court found, however, that “for purposes of
section 101.106, a general right to change the terms and conditions of
employment should not trump control of the details of Gonski’s employ-
ment . . . as provided in the version of the Handbook and other legal
documents under which Gonski in reality worked.”28
This case, therefore, reveals a somewhat counterintuitive issue in as-
serting governmental immunity. An individual paid by a government unit,
who performs tasks under the control of a governmental unit, may not be
entitled to dismissal under Section 101.106 pursuant to governmental im-
munity when payment and oversight are not contained within the same
governmental unit and the defendant identifies only one unit as the single
employer entitling them to the status of “employee.”
However, the supreme court noted, and perhaps signaled suggestions
for, other possible approaches. The supreme court wrote that Dr. Gonski
did not argue that the Foundation and UTHSCH should be treated as a
single, umbrella entity for the purposes of Section 101.106.29 Addition-
ally, the supreme court called attention to the fact that Dr. Gonski did
not argue she was an employee because she was paid by one governmen-
tal unit and subject to the legal control of another.30 The supreme court
expressly stated that they would not explore these issues and would issue
no opinion on their possible validity.31
Due to the great number of doctors practicing in connection with gov-
ernmental units, this case law is likely to develop further, toward greater
23. Id. at 407–08.
24. Id. at 404.
25. Id. at 406.
26. Id. at 407.
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clarity.32 However, until that time residents and insurance providers
should be well aware of the state of the law, and attorneys on both plain-
tiffs’ and defendants’ sides should be particularly diligent when consider-
ing the status of any individual as an “employee” of a governmental unit.
B. TEXAS COURTS CONTINUE TO ADDRESS EXPERT
TESTIMONY ON CAUSATION
During the Survey period, Texas courts continued to wrestle with the
sufficiency of expert testimony to demonstrate causation. Our Survey
highlights two such cases, demonstrating the push and pull and continuing
development in this area of liability law.
1. Texas Home Health Skilled Servs., LP v. Anderson
Prior to April 25, 2014, Elizabeth Timmons was under the care of a Dr.
Rosenquist and Texas Home Health for the monitoring and testing of
blood coagulation levels as well as general care.33 However, according to
pleadings in the eventual lawsuit, Ms. Timmons’s levels were not tested or
monitored since at least February 26, 2014.34 On April 25, 2014, Ms. Tim-
mons suffered a stroke at a family member’s home.35 Subsequent testing
revealed an INR (a measure of blood coagulation) level of 15.36 A nor-
mal range for INR is 2–3, and higher levels are correlated with increased
risk of stroke.37
Ms. Timmons was placed in West Houston Medical Center and, accord-
ing to pleadings, encountered inadequate medical attention, suffering
bedsores, significant skin breakdown, dehydration, and acute renal fail-
ure.38 Ms. Timmons’ daughter, Judy Anderson, transferred her mother to
the Huntsville Healthcare Center due to the inadequate care, but her
condition worsened and she was transferred to Huntsville Memorial Hos-
pital.39 According to the pleadings, Ms. Timmons continued to receive
inadequate care, suffering kidney failure and an inability to swallow or
talk.40 Ms. Timmons progressively declined and was ultimately unable to
recover, dying on June 7, 2014.41
Ms. Timmons’ daughter, Judy Anderson, filed a wrongful death and
survival suit in the 278th District Court of Walker County, Texas against
multiple parties including Texas Home Health Skilled Services, L.P.
32. See, e.g., Skapek v. Perkins, No. 05-16-00796-CV, 2017 WL 655950, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 17, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
33. See Texas Home Health Skilled Servs., LP v. Anderson, No. 10-15-00440-CV, 2016






39. Id. at *2.
40. Id.
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(THH).42 Specifically, Ms. Anderson asserted claims of negligence, vicari-
ous liability, and gross negligence related to the death of her mother.43
Though Ms. Anderson served expert reports, THH challenged their suffi-
ciency.44 The trial court found the expert reports sufficient, but the Waco
Court of Appeals reversed on appeal, finding the reports insufficient as to
causation.45
The court of appeals sent the matter back to the trial court to make a
determination as to whether the deficiencies could be cured.46 After sup-
plements were made to the report, THH filed a motion to dismiss, which
was denied.47 An interlocutory appeal followed.
As discussed thoroughly in previous Surveys, the Texas Medical Liabil-
ity Act (codified as Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 74)
requires plaintiffs asserting a “health care liability claim” (HCLC) to
serve each defendant with an expert report within 120 days after the de-
fendant’s original answer or risk dismissal for the case with prejudice.48
The report must include “a fair summary of the expert’s opinions” as of
the date of the report regarding, among other items, the causal relation-
ship between the asserted failure to meet applicable standards and the
claimed injury.49
The only issue before the appellate court was whether the expert re-
ports met the causation requirement by explaining how THH’s alleged
breach leading to a subdural hematoma was a substantial factor in Ms.
Timmons’s death from dehydration and acute renal failure.50 Though the
original report listed a number of risk factors, in the supplemented report
the expert opined that Ms. Timmons became dehydrated due to her sub-
dural hematoma, which in and of itself was caused by THH’s failure to
properly monitor her Coumadin intake.51
The appellate court noted that the expert report did not explain the
conclusion that the subdural hematoma was the superior or medically-
preferable cause of Timmons’s death, especially when compared to other
risk factors that were detailed in the first expert report.52 The court deter-
mined, therefore, that the reports were conclusory and raised no more
than a possibility of causation.53 Collecting a number of recent cases dem-
onstrating insufficient causal links, the court concluded that, without a
causal link between THH’s care and Ms. Timmons’s death, the trial court
42. Id. at *1.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *11.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at *1.
48. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a), (b)(2) (West 2017).
49. Id. § 74.351(a), (r)(6).
50. Anderson, 2017 WL 4079595, at *3.
51. Id. at *4.
52. Id.
53. Id.
2018] Professional Liability 333
abused its discretion in denying THH’s motion to dismiss.54
2. Bustamante v. Ponte
D.B., a premature infant, suffered loss of vision.55 A jury reached the
conclusion that the infant’s neonatologist proximately caused the loss of
vision due to negligence.56 The case was brought before the Dallas Court
of Appeals to consider whether the experts established causation to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty.57
The evidence showed that D.B., due to severe prematurity, had a
90%–100% chance of developing retinopathy of prematurity (ROP),
which affects blood vessel growth in the eyes.58 These abnormalities can
cause diminished vision or blindness, but blindness of this fashion is typi-
cally preventable.59 Yet, D.B. suffered ROP and lost all vision in her right
eye and severe impairment in her left eye.60 D.B.’s parents sued several
defendants, asserting negligence by D.B.’s doctors. In particular, they as-
serted that they failed to timely schedule follow-up appointments and
corrective eye surgery, presenting expert testimony to support these
positions.61
Like in Anderson, the appellate court in Bustamante found that the
experts’ opinions on causation were conclusory and insufficient because
they failed to rule out other possible causes of the injury.62 On appeal,
the Texas Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Dallas Court of
Appeals in almost every facet of the appellate court’s decision.
First, the supreme court corrected the Dallas Court of Appeals’ use of
a but-for causation test when there was proof of more than one proxi-
mate cause of injury.63 Specifically, the case involved the alleged com-
bined negligence of two doctors, and the supreme court noted that it has
long been the law in Texas that “a defendant’s act or omission need not
be the sole cause of an injury, as long as it is a substantial factor in bring-
ing about the injury.”64 Thus, the appellate court should have applied the
substantial-factor test, rather than a stringent but-for test. Considering
the substantial-factor test, the supreme court found that there was abun-
dant evidence in the record that the doctors’ failure to timely diagnose
and treat D.B.’s ROP resulted in retinal detachment and vision
impairment.65
54. Id.






61. Id. at 451.
62. Id. at 454.
63. Id. at 457–59.
64. Id. at 457 (citing Havner v. E-Z Mark Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex.
1992)).
65. Id. at 459.
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Second, the supreme court corrected the court of appeals’ rejection of
statistical evidence presented by the plaintiffs. The supreme court noted
that this case was distinguishable from a case in which a statistical survey
was used in isolation to establish general causation without supporting
evidence of direct proof.66 The supreme court found that, in this case, the
statistical evidence was but one factor relied on by the experts and was
supplemented with clinical experience and direct examination of D.B.
and her medical records.67
Finally, and perhaps most importantly in this context, the supreme
court discussed how the experts adequately offered the bases for their
opinions. The supreme court noted that the expert testimony must estab-
lish a “how” and a “why” supporting its conclusions.68 The supreme court
then exhaustively analyzed the experts’ testimony in detail, noting that
the experts’ opinions were not perfect, but they “did not simply state a
conclusion without any explanation or ask the jurors to take their word
for it.”69 Further, they noted that expert opinions do not have to disprove
every conceivable cause, but merely the plausible causes.70
While providing some guidance about adequate causation evidence,
the actual method employed by the court—a detailed, fact-specific analy-
sis—does not demonstrate an expansion or simplification of the standards
for expert testimony in medical malpractice cases. If there is some wis-
dom that can be gleaned from the joint consideration of Anderson and
Bustamante, it is perhaps that disagreements and confusion continues in
the courts, and detailed, fact-specific analysis at the supreme court level
suggests the possibility of somewhat less than mechanical results.
III. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
A. EXPERT TESTIMONY ON CAUSATION AT THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE
1. The Difficulty of Causation at Summary Judgment
As discussed in last year’s Annual Texas Survey, legal malpractice
claimants and the courts that hear them must inevitably grapple with the
question of causation and the type of evidence required to establish it.
2017 was no different, but this year the Texas Supreme Court offered
significant guidance on what does and does not satisfy the requirements
to demonstrate an issue of material fact regarding causation at the sum-
mary judgment stage. In one case, the supreme court offered a lesson in
just how difficult avoiding summary judgment on this essential element of
a malpractice claim can be. But, as if to assure court watchers that it could
be done, another case found the supreme court convinced that an issue of
66. Id. at 460.
67. Id. at 461.
68. Id. at 462.
69. Id. at 465.
70. Id. at 468.
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fact had been raised with respect to causation and that summary judg-
ment was inappropriate. A look at these two cases offers attorneys per-
spective on the supreme court’s recent views on causation evidence.
Though the cases reach different outcomes, they both reiterate and un-
derscore the type of evidence required to defeat summary judgment on
causation.
The first case from the Texas Supreme Court, Rogers v. Zanetti, consid-
ered three possible instances of malpractice but found all three of them
wanting.71 The underlying action that gave rise to the malpractice claim
involved a business dispute over a home health care company. The plain-
tiffs in the case, Daniel and Leslie Alexander and Judith Pucci, founded a
home health care business called Accent Home Health.72 The defendant,
James Rogers, owned other healthcare businesses, and upon learning of
Accent’s existence, Rogers viewed it as a potential investment opportu-
nity.73 Rogers approached the founders of Accent and represented him-
self as well-connected in the medical community due to his outpatient
clinic businesses.74 Rogers expressed interest in the success of the busi-
ness and emphasized the value his experience, professional network, and
administrative support could provide to their new enterprise.75 He also
indicated that he had substantial investment resources at his disposal.76 In
exchange for his professional services and a $250,000 dollar investment in
Accent, Accent’s founders agreed to grant Rogers a majority stake in the
business.77 Victor Zanetti, Rogers’s attorney and subsequently one of the
defendants in Rogers’s malpractice case, drafted an agreement to memo-
rialize the deal.78
Once the agreement had been executed, Rogers and his associate Wil-
liam Burmeister assumed financial control of the business.79 Mr.
Bumeister, a certified public accountant who served as the chief financial
officer in Rogers’s other ventures, tended to the financial affairs of Ac-
cent while the original founders were to focus on expanding the busi-
ness.80 Unfortunately, the founders discovered that Rogers had begun
transferring funds from the company accounts to an account only he had
access to and ultimately realized that he had not even made the promised
$250,000 investment.81 Accent’s founders sued for fraud, conversion and
civil theft, civil conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty.82 At Zanetti’s
recommendation, Rogers hired Charles Perry as trial counsel, who served
71. Rogers v. Zanetti, 518 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Tex. 2017).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 398–99.
74. Id. at 398.
75. Id. at 399.
76. Id. at 398–99.
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in that role until shortly before trial.83 Ultimately, the jury found for Ac-
cent’s founders and awarded damages.84 The court’s final judgment also
voided the original investment agreement for lack of consideration, un-
conscionability, and fraudulent inducement.85 The Dallas Court of Ap-
peals affirmed.86 This underlying litigation is referred to here and in the
supreme court’s opinion as the Alexander case.”87
Rogers sued Zanetti, Perry, and the Andrews Kurth law firm years
later alleging malpractice.88 Rogers claimed that Perry had a conflict of
interest when he accepted the role as trial counsel because Zanetti and
Perry both worked at Andrews Kurth.89 This conflict, Rogers contended,
also led Perry not to name Zanetti and Andrews Kurth as responsible
third parties in the Alexander case, a move Rogers felt would have been
warranted and taken but for Perry’s favoritism for his colleague and em-
ployer.90 Rogers further claimed that Perry engaged in multiple instances
of negligent conduct when he failed to present a settlement offer to Rog-
ers, failed to designate an expert to counter the plaintiffs’ expert’s valua-
tion of Accent, and conducted discovery in a manner that prejudiced the
defense.91 Finally, Rogers claimed that his attorneys in the Alexander
case breached their fiduciary duties and should reimburse him for the
attorneys’ fees he paid.92
Faced with a motion for summary judgment from the attorneys, the
trial court granted the motion.93 While the trial court did not specify its
reasons, the malpractice defendants argued that there was no evidence of
causation, that the breach of fiduciary duty claims were simply negligence
claims, and that collateral estoppel, the Alexander court’s finding on
fraud, and the statute of limitations barred Rogers’s malpractice claims.94
The court of appeals considered whether Rogers raised an issue of fact as
to whether the attorneys’ negligence caused Rogers’s injury.95 Conclud-
ing that it had not, the court of appeals affirmed.96
Before the supreme court, Rogers argued that the traditional suit-
within-a-suit method of examining legal malpractice claims should not ap-
ply to four of his claims.97 Specifically, Rogers argued that the approach




86. Id. (citing Rogers v. Alexander, 244 S.W.3d 370 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet.
denied).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 399–400.








97. Id. at 401.
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ment agreement; (2) Perry should have joined Zanetti and Andrews
Kurth as responsible third parties; (3) Perry should have designated an
expert to rebut the valuation of Accent; and (4) Perry should have com-
municated a settlement offer in the Alexander litigation.98
The supreme court first considered Rogers’s claims that Zanetti negli-
gently drafted the agreement and that, as such, Perry should have joined
Zanetti and his law firm.99 The defendants noted the finding in the Alex-
ander case that Rogers had defrauded Accent’s founders, thereby voiding
the investment agreement, and argued that, regardless of how it was
drafted, any claim of malpractice stemming from the agreement would
necessarily fail to establish causation because the agreement itself was
void.100 Rogers contended that the agreement was transactional malprac-
tice that at least partially caused his damages.101 He advocated that the
court apply a “substantial factor” test of causation to his claim rather
than requiring him to establish that the agreement was the proximate
cause of his damages.102
Setting aside the fact that Rogers raised his “substantial factor” argu-
ment for the first time on appeal, the supreme court walked through the
proximate cause requirements typically applied to legal malpractice
claims and negligence claims more generally.103 In explaining that proxi-
mate cause requires a showing of cause-in-fact and foreseeability, the su-
preme court reiterated that proving cause-in-fact requires showing both
that the act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the harm and
that without that act or omission the harm would not have occurred.104
Put differently, the supreme court emphasized that “our cause-in-fact
standard requires not only that the act or omission be a substantial factor
but also that it be a but-for cause of the injury or occurrence.”105 Accord-
ingly, the supreme court presumed that Rogers was advocating the appli-
cation of only half of the cause-in-fact standard, the substantial factor
requirement, while seeking to have the court cast aside but-for
causation.106
The supreme court declined this invitation, noting earlier decisions
describing “a cause-in-fact definition that omits the but-for component as
‘incomplete’” and citing scholarly work describing use of the substantial
factor requirement decoupled from but-for causation as appropriate in
only rare concurrent-cause situations.107 Rogers’s case did not present a
case of concurrent cause, so the standard cause-in-fact requirement of
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 401–02.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 402.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 402–03.
105. Id. at 403.
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 223 (Tex. 2010)).
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but-for causation applied.108 Accordingly, the supreme court concluded
that the court of appeals did not err in demanding cause-in-fact and fail-
ing to apply Rogers’s preferred substantial-factor-only test.109
The supreme court next considered Perry’s failure to designate an ex-
pert to rebut the Alexander plaintiff’s expert valuation of Accent.110 The
plaintiffs’ expert valued Accent at $2,493,611.68, and the jury returned an
award that split that amount evenly between the company’s original foun-
ders.111 As a result of Perry’s choice not to designate any expert to rebut
that valuation, the jury heard no competing testimony on valuation from
the defense, which Rogers claimed was malpractice and resulted in an
unnecessarily inflated award.112
The supreme court began its analysis by correcting the defendants’ mis-
impression that suit-within-a-suit causation requires a showing that the
party would have won the case but for the attorney malpractice.113
Rather, malpractice claims frequently involve accusations that an attor-
ney’s missteps hurt the value of a claim or defense and those claims do
not hinge on the ultimate success or failure of the suit as a whole.114 As
such, “different cases involve different injuries and different causal
links.”115 In Rogers’s case, he claimed that the failure to present a rebut-
tal expert led to an award of higher damages.116 So, the supreme court
concluded, Rogers needed to present evidence that the high award was
more likely than not caused by the failure to put on expert testimony.117
To make such a showing would require expert testimony on causation,
and the parties disputed the adequacy of the evidence Rogers’s experts
had offered.118
The supreme court evaluated the testimony of each of Rogers’s ex-
perts.119 First, the court found the testimony of a valuation expert lacking
because, while it demonstrated the availability of valuation testimony, it
did nothing to show that such testimony would have altered the verdict in
the case.120 Next, the supreme court considered testimony by a litigation
expert who testified that Perry’s choice was risky and that one of the
attorneys who had handled the case felt that by failing to offer expert
testimony on valuation, the defense offered the jury no alternative on
damages, which that attorney viewed as a significant contributing factor
in the resulting damages award.121 Dispensing first with the testimony
108. Id.
109. Id. at 403–04.






116. Id. at 405.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 406.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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that failure to designate an expert was risky, the supreme court noted that
this testimony did nothing to show causation and instead related to the
breach-of-duty element of a malpractice claim.122 As for the claim that an
attorney on the case viewed the absence of an expert as a contributing
factor in the award, the court rejected this recitation of another person’s
opinion without providing a basis for that opinion as “no evidence” and
an “ipse dixit.”123 The supreme court also reminded again that the appro-
priate standard for causation is but-for, not substantial contributing fac-
tor, thus rendering the testimony inadequate to meet the required causal
standard.124
The supreme court next turned to the testimony of one of the attorneys
who tried the Alexander case before the jury.125 The attorney, Peter
Marketos, offered somewhat remarkable testimony regarding a juror on
the case who contacted him after the trial and explained that the jurors
had debated a lower award but decided that because they had no compet-
ing evidence, they would credit the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert.126
Consequently, Marketos concluded that the absence of defense expert
testimony caused the high verdict.127
Assuming the admissibility of the evidence, the supreme court found it
inadequate.128 The supreme court stressed the need to compare the case
as it actually occurred with a hypothetical case in which the alleged mis-
take never happened.129 In the Alexander case, the question involves a
comparison between what happened and what would have happened if
the jury had heard the omitted expert testimony.130 Rogers would need to
show that the hypothetical result would more likely than not produce a
lower verdict than the actual result.131 But the supreme court found that
Marketos’s affidavit failed to accomplish these tasks because it offered no
such comparison.132 The supreme court determined that a “juror’s (even-
tually abandoned) reservations about testimony in the actual case is no
support for an opinion that a reasonable jury would have credited the
testimony of a competing expert (like Hahn [the valuation expert dis-
cussed above]) had it been given the chance.”133 The supreme court also
suggested that Marketos would have needed to provide seemingly impos-
sible opinions regarding the juror’s credibility comparison of the plain-
tiffs’ expert and a defense expert that never was.134 In the absence of an
in-depth comparison between the real and the hypothetical, the supreme
122. Id. (citing Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1989)).
123. Id. at 406–07.
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court characterized Marketos’s affidavit as speculative, conclusory, and
incompetent summary judgment evidence.135
Finally, the supreme court evaluated the causation opinion of a defense
attorney for Burmeister, Rogers’s associate in the case.136 Here too, the
affidavit was found to be conclusory.137 While the court conceded that
the attorney’s experience litigating the Alexander case at issue would cer-
tainly bolster his credibility and familiarity with the facts, credibility and
familiarity were not enough to provide the required “demonstrable and
reasoned basis” for his opinion on causation.138 The supreme court also
pointed out that the attorney’s opinion that the evidence on valuation
was insufficient to support the valuation the jury adopted was necessarily
false because a court of appeals had determined that the evidence on
valuation was sufficient as a matter of law.139 And like Marketos’s af-
fadavit, the court determined that the other attorney’s affidavit was inad-
equate because it did not provide evidence demonstrating that testimony
from a defense expert on valuation would likely have changed the re-
sult.140 In sum, none of the four experts’ affidavits presented by Rogers
provided adequate evidence to create a fact issue regarding whether the
failure to designate a rebuttal expert caused an oversized verdict.141
The final issue before the court was whether a fact issue existed as to
whether Perry’s failure to communicate a settlement offer caused Rog-
ers’s harm.142 The supreme court found it did not.143 Rogers took the
position that he did not know of the settlement offer, and that if he had,
he would have instructed his lawyer to negotiate a settlement.144 Perry
and Andrews Kurth took the position that, even assuming Rogers’s state-
ment was true, it did not raise a fact issue on causation because the record
lacked evidence that he could have settled the case or that a settlement
would have actually occurred.145 In other words, Rogers’s intent to try to
settle did not demonstrate the case actually would or could have settled.
The court of appeals and the supreme court agreed.146
The Rogers case is perhaps most instructive in revealing just how diffi-
cult showing causation at the summary judgment stage of a legal malprac-
tice case can be. Though not surprising given established law, the
supreme court’s repeated efforts to stress the cause-in-fact standard and
its requirement to show that an act or omission was the but-for cause of
the plaintiff’s damages should leave little doubt that efforts urging the
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 409.
138. Id. at 409–10.
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court to adopt a more forgiving causation standard will prove fruitless.
The supreme court’s treatment of Rogers’s expert witness affidavits adds
to the difficulty in meeting this standard because, despite the witnesses’
deep familiarity with the case and, in one instance, the thinking of at least
one of the jurors, their testimony proved inadequate to show causation.
Experts offering opinions on causation will be judged by high standards
and be deemed to have met them only where they can explain a demon-
strable and reasoned basis for a conclusion that a different outcome was
likely in the absence of the relevant act or omission. Rogers demonstrates
the need for attorneys pursuing malpractice claims to make early evalua-
tions about how and on what basis they will present evidence regarding
causation. In doing so, those attorneys can ensure that adequate and ap-
propriate evidence is offered or make an early assessment in the litigation
as to whether such a showing is even possible under the law. Finally, the
supreme court’s ruling on the settlement offer Rogers never received re-
minds practitioners that simply raising an additional variable without di-
rectly and causally tying it to a clear and provable alternative scenario
will not benefit their claims. In fact, calling attention to the number and
variety of causal variables present and discussed in the Rogers case may
even be a disservice if it makes proving that any one of them was a but-
for cause more difficult.
2. The Texas Supreme Court Revisits Causation Evidence at Summary
Judgment
The Texas Supreme Court once again considered whether an expert
opinion was conclusory in Starwood Management, LLC ex rel. Gonzalez
v. Swaim.147 The legal issue that led to the malpractice claim involved
Norma Gonzalez and her business, Starwood Management, LLC
(Starwood), which owned a number of airplanes.148 For reasons that need
not be explored in this Survey, several of Starwood’s airplanes were
seized by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).149 Starwood’s insurer
hired attorney Don Swaim to take on the DEA with respect to one of the
seized airplanes and hopefully secure its recovery.150
In order to contest the seizure, the DEA presented Swaim with three
options.151 He could file suit against the agency in federal court, file a
petition for remission or mitigation with the agency’s Forfeiture Counsel,
or do both.152 Federal regulations required that if Swaim intended to file
suit in court, he would need to provide notice to the DEA’s Forfeiture
Counsel within thirty days of receiving the notice of the seizure.153 Once
in federal court, the DEA would be required to show by a preponderance
147. 530 S.W.3d 673, 676 (Tex. 2017).
148. Id. at 676–77.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 677.
152. Id.
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of the evidence that the Agency’s decision to seize the plane was legally
proper.154 By contrast, in proceedings before the Forfeiture Counsel initi-
ated by the petition for remission or mitigation, federal regulations pro-
vide the Forfeiture Counsel complete discretion regarding whether to
return seized assets.155
Swaim sought to pursue both actions simultaneously, but he failed to
file the required notice with the Forfeiture Counsel regarding his claim in
federal court.156 Consequently, his claim in federal court was dis-
missed.157 In response to his petition for remission or mitigation, the
DEA sought to depose Gonzalez.158 Gonzalez declined, citing her Fifth
Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination, and her petition was de-
nied.159 Swaim moved to have the Forfeiture Counsel reconsider its deci-
sion, but while Gonzalez agreed to a limited deposition, she refused to
waive her Fifth Amendment rights, and the Counsel denied the mo-
tion.160 With no remaining avenues to challenge the seizure, Starwood
and Gonzalez had lost the plane.161 Starwood and Gonzalez sued Swaim
for malpractice.162
All of this occurred while another attorney, George Crow, pursued the
return of six other aircraft seized from Starwood.163 Unlike Swaim, Crow
filed the notice required to file suit in federal court, and by the time of
the motion for summary judgement in the case against Swaim, Crow had
secured the return of five of the aircraft.164 In response to Swaim’s mo-
tion for summary judgment, which alleged that Starwood had failed to
show Swaim’s actions caused Starwood’s loss, Starwood offered the affi-
davits of Crow and another attorney named Steve Jumes.165 Both opined
that, based on Crow’s experience with the other five aircraft, Swaim
could have recovered the plane if he had filed the proper notice required
to proceed in federal court.166 Crow and Jumes stated that they felt the
DEA had a weak case for seizure, that Swaim’s factual circumstances
with respect to the aircraft were identical to those faced by Crow, and
that Swaim’s failure to file the notice needed to proceed in court, where
the DEA would have the burden, caused the loss of the plane.167
The district court refused to consider the affidavits of Crow and Jumes
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determined that Crow’s affidavit was conclusory due to its failure to
make a case-by-case comparison of the facts of Swaim’s case with other
aircraft seizure cases.169 The court of appeals also rejected Jumes’ affida-
vit on the grounds that it was unsupported by factual allegations.170
Before the Texas Supreme Court, Starwood challenged the court of ap-
peals’ determination that Crow’s affidavit was conclusory.171
The supreme court began its review of the case by laying out the ele-
ments of a malpractice claim and detailing what is required to prove cau-
sation.172 Citing Rogers, the court emphasized that a plaintiff claiming
malpractice must show cause-in-fact, which requires a showing of but-for
causation demonstrated through the suit-within-a-suit inquiry.173 And, as
seen in the Rogers case, to do so at the summary judgment stage requires
expert evidence on causation that is probative and raises a fact issue; tes-
timony that is conclusory will not suffice.174
Swaim offered a variety of arguments for why the supreme court
should consider Crow’s affidavit to be conclusory. First, the supreme
court considered Swaim’s argument that Crow’s affidavit was facially con-
clusory because it did not include a “demonstrable and reasoned basis”
for his conclusion and did not engage in the requisite case-by-case factual
comparison of Swaim’s case with other cases of plane seizure.175 The su-
preme court disagreed.176 Instead, the supreme court stressed its explana-
tion in Rogers that the principal consideration when determining whether
expert testimony in a legal malpractice claim is conclusory is essentially
whether that testimony explains why the expert reached a particular con-
clusion.177 To do so, the expert “affidavit must explain the link between
the facts the expert relied upon and the opinion reached.”178
The supreme court, while acknowledging that Crow might have done a
better job explaining the basis for his opinion, stated that Crow’s lack of
detail represented an issue of quality rather than adequacy and did not
alter his underlying conclusion—that Swaim would have recovered the
plane if he had filed the appropriate notice to pursue the matter in fed-
eral court.179 The key question for the supreme court in assessing the
adequacy of Crow’s testimony was whether Crow had explained why he
reached that conclusion.180 In this case, the supreme court felt that he
had.181 Crow had followed the same course of action—which he claimed
169. Id. (citing Elizondo v. Krist, 415 S.W.3d 259, 265 (Tex. 2013)).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 678–79.
173. Id. (citing Rogers v. Zanetti, 518 S.W.3d 394, 402 (Tex. 2017)).
174. Id. at 679.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citing Rogers, 518 S.W.3d at 405).
178. Id. (citing Rogers, 518 S.W.3d at 405; Elizondo v. Krist, 415 S.W.3d 259, 266 (Tex.
2013)).
179. Id.
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181. Id.
344 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
Swaim should have followed—six times and had obtained the result
Swaim desired five out of six times.182 The court credited his explanation
for his conclusion as both demonstrable and reasoned, explaining that he
had demonstrated the merits of filing the required notice through success
with his cases and that those wins provided a reasonable basis for his
conclusion that such a filing probably would have obtained a similar re-
sult for Swaim.183
Swaim’s characterization of Crow’s affidavit as a conclusory ipse dixit
was also rejected based on the relatively narrow gap between the data
Crow relied upon—his success in the five other cases where he filed the
notice—and his conclusion that Swaim would likely have obtained similar
results if he had also filed the required notice.184 Similarly, the supreme
court dismissed Swaim’s claim that Crow’s failure to address the issue of
Gonzalez’s testimony, or lack thereof, rendered the affidavit con-
clusory.185 From Crow’s standpoint, looking to the hypothetical case in
which Swaim had filed the notice, Crow concluded that Gonzalez likely
never would have been called to testify because the case would have been
resolved before she had been asked to do so, just as had happened in the
cases Crow handled.186 The supreme court agreed that such a conclusion
was reasonable, not conclusory.187 And, contrary to Swaim’s argument,
the addition of Crow’s opinion that the DEA had a weak case also failed
to render the affidavit conclusory.188 The supreme court determined
Crow’s main conclusion had a demonstrable and reasoned basis regard-
less of any tangential opinions and conclusions with shakier support.189
Swaim also argued that Crow’s affidavit was conclusory because it
failed to offer a detailed comparison of the aircraft involved, including
model, value, owners, and other distinguishing characteristics as well as
the location of seizure.190 But the supreme court rejected this argument
too, viewing the basis for Crow’s conclusion as procedural and thus unaf-
fected by these superficial details about the planes.191 Crow looked at two
possible outcomes, the loss or return of the planes, which were seized
under the same federal statute and governed by the same procedural
rules.192 Nothing about his conclusion hinged on details about the planes
or where they were seized, so the supreme court considered those details
immaterial.193 But even if greater detail had been required, the supreme
court was satisfied that Crow had included documents with detail on the
182. Id.
183. Id.
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comparator cases with his affidavit and had referenced those documents,
which the court considered adequate and not conclusory.194
Finally, Swaim argued that Crow’s affidavit was conclusory because it
failed to consider and explain away various ways in which the DEA might
have prevailed if it had pushed the case at trial.195 Looking again to Rog-
ers, the supreme court reiterated that sufficient evidence of causation
would show that the outcome in the hypothetical case would more likely
than not be different than the outcome in the case that Swaim actually
handled.196 The supreme court found it “unnecessary for an expert in a
case such as this to provide a legal analysis of every possible exigency, no
matter how remote,” and ultimately concluded that the affidavit was not
conclusory for failure to do so.197
The Starwood Management case demonstrates that the burden required
to defeat summary judgment is not unmanageable but still requires a
heavy lift. Most plaintiffs alleging malpractice will not be fortunate
enough to have five nearly identical cases to rely on when attempting to
demonstrate that their case might have turned out differently but for a
single act or omission. That said, Starwood Management does offer sound
lessons for expert testimony offered in more difficult or closer cases. For
example, to the greatest extent possible, an expert’s opinion should be
based in tangible outcomes which can be pointed to as the basis for arriv-
ing at the expert’s conclusion. As the Rogers court made clear, basing an
opinion on the opinion of someone else rather than concrete facts is al-
most certainly inadequate. As a general rule, the closer the nexus be-
tween the facts supporting the opinion and the opinion itself, the better.
And while the basis for an opinion may seem obvious to an expert, the
extraordinary difficulty of demonstrating causation dictates in favor of
over-explaining and providing supporting documentation.
IV. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
During the Survey period, Texas courts addressed several issues includ-
ing the limited availability of constructive trusts for breaches of fiduciary
duty, the relationship between indemnity and settlement agreements, the
standard for piercing the corporate veil in reverse, and the apparent dis-
crepancy between the statutory protections afforded to officers under the
Texas Business Organizations Code and seemingly contradictory caselaw.
A. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT ISSUES AN OPINION ON THE
LIMITED AVAILABILITY OF AWARDING CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUSTS FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
On February 9, 2017, the Texas Supreme Court issued an opinion re-
garding constructive trusts—namely their limited availability and the
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. (quoting Rogers v. Zanetti, 518 S.W.3d 394, 408 (Tex. 2017)).
197. Id.
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proofs required to award a constructive trust to a party prevailing on a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.198
In Longview, the plaintiff, Longview Energy Company (Longview),
sued two of its directors for breach of fiduciary duty, usurpation of corpo-
rate opportunity, and competing with the corporation.199
In 2006, the Huff Energy Fund (HEF) bought shares of Longview and
appointed Bill Huff and Rick D’Angelo to Longview’s board of direc-
tors.200 Three years later, HEF independently and discretely opened dia-
logue with Bobby Riley about oil and gas investment opportunities in the
Eagle Ford formation.201 The discussions resulted in the formation of the
Riley-Huff Energy Group LLC (Riley-Huff).202 That same month, HEF
told Longview that if Longview located an investment in the Eagle Ford
formation, HEF would fund the acquisition.203 As a result, Longview
spent considerable time and money searching for an attractive
opportunity.204
Longview met with brokers Tamara Ford and Pat Gooden (the Long-
view Consultants) who provided the company with a map of attractive
and available acreage in the Eagle Ford formation.205 Importantly, the
map did not identify specific acreage or lease locations; it merely repre-
sented the available acreage in “blobs” measuring more than 235,000
acres each.206 D’Angelo requested personal copies of the maps.207
Shortly thereafter, Longview called a board meeting to vote on acquir-
ing some of the acreage identified by the Longview Consultants, relying
on HEF’s earlier representation that it would fund such acquisitions.208
HEF’s representative D’Angelo did not support the proposal; it was
tabled.209
Longview brought breach of fiduciary duty claims against Bill Huff and
Rick D’Angelo as directors of Longview when it learned that Riley-Huff
had been formed, that Riley-Huff had purchased Eagle Ford leases from
the Longview Consultants just three days before Longview’s board meet-
ing, and that 5,200 of the 50,000 acres acquired by Riley-Huff were lo-
cated in the “blobs” on the maps considered by Longview’s board.210
At trial, the jury returned a favorable verdict for Longview, determin-
ing that Huff and D’Angelo both breached their fiduciary duties to Long-
view by usurping corporate opportunities and engaging in direct
198. Longview Energy Co. v. Huff Energy Fund LP, 533 S.W.3d 866 (Tex. 2017).
199. Id. at 868.
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competition.211 The trial court awarded Longview $95.5 million and im-
posed a constructive trust on the vast majority of Riley-Huff’s Eagle Ford
acreage.212 On appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court because Longview failed to identify any specific leases in the
Longview Consultant’s proposal, and determined that Huff and
D’Angelo’s acquisitions did not “hinder or defeat the plans and purposes
of the corporation.”213 The court of appeals also found that Longview did
not have “an interest or a reasonable expectancy in the opportunity” be-
cause there were still millions of acres available for lease in the Eagle
Ford.214
On review, the supreme court determined that the issue of remedies
was dispositive, “assum[ed] without deciding[ ]” that the breach of fiduci-
ary duty claims against Huff and D’Angelo were viable and supported by
the evidence, and further found that there was no evidence to support the
trial court’s award of damages.215
Huff and D’Angelo argued that awarding a constructive trust was erro-
neous because Longview had not properly “traced” assets acquired from
the breaches.216 The supreme court agreed, holding that “the party seek-
ing a constructive trust on property has the burden to identify the particu-
lar property on which it seeks to have a constructive trust imposed.”217
The supreme court further clarified that “[d]efinitive, designated property,
wrongfully withheld from another, is the very heart and soul of the con-
structive trust theory.”218
The supreme court distinguished its current disposition from its deci-
sion in Wilz v. Flournoy, which concerned a father’s improper use of
funds to pay monthly installments on his farm.219 The supreme court
characterized Wilz as only having dealt with a single property instead of
multiple properties like the case at bar.220 As such, and in contrast to
Wilz, “the leases were separately identifiable, were not purchased with
commingled funds, and were identified, lease by lease, in both the evi-
dence and the judgment.”221 The supreme court determined that “Long-
view had the burden to prove that, as to each lease for which it sought
equitable relief of disgorgement or imposition of a constructive trust,
Riley-Huff acquired that lease as a result of Huff’s or D’Angelo’s
211. Id. at 871.
212. Id.
213. The Huff Energy Fund, L.P. v. Longview Energy Co., 482 S.W.3d 184, 191–94
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015), aff’d sub nom. Longview Energy Co. v. Huff Energy Fund
LP, 533 S.W.3d 866 (Tex. 2017).
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218. Id. (quoting KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 88 (Tex. 2015) (emphasis
added)).
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breaches of fiduciary duties.”222
The supreme court found that no such “tracing” had occurred, and in
fact, tracing would have been impossible because the lease brokers only
presented Longview with non-descriptive “blobs” representing 235,000
acres, only 21,000 of which were in dispute.223 As such, there was a lack
of “evidence tracing a breach of fiduciary duty by Huff or D’Angelo to
specific leases . . . support[ing] the imposition of a constructive trust on
those leases.”224
The holding is a win for officers and directors generally, requiring
plaintiffs to causally “trace” itemized damages (in this case, properties) to
discrete breaches of fiduciary duties. Still, the Longview decision demon-
strates that director and officer liability is severely limited—if not totally
moot—where no remedy exists.
B. THE FIRST HOUSTON COURT OF APPEALS GRAPPLES WITH THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A FORMER CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER’S
INDEMNITY PROVISION AND A SUBSEQUENTLY
EXECUTED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
On July 27, 2017, the First Houston Court of Appeals held that a dis-
gruntled former officer was prohibited from collecting judgment against
the former Chief Executive Officer of his company because the officer
and the company had entered into a settlement agreement providing that
the officer would not seek damages from the company “directly or
indirectly.”225
In Sandt, the court of appeals sought to determine whether Energy
Maintenance Services Group, I, LLC’s (Energy Maintenance) agreement
to indemnify its former Chief Executive Officer, Timothy Nesler (Nesler)
obligated the company to indemnify Nesler from a judgment rendered
against him in a separate suit, and whether a properly executed settle-
ment agreement precluded collection of that judgment.226
In 2005, a former officer, Jim Sandt (Sandt), sued Energy Maintenance
and Nesler for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.227 Two years after the
filing, Energy Maintenance’s board of directors decided to indemnify
Nesler for any liability arising from Sandt’s claims.228
In 2009, Sandt’s claims were tried to a jury who found in favor of Sandt
and awarded him $780,000 in damages and attorney’s fees from Energy
Maintenance and Nesler jointly and severally.229 Sandt was also awarded
$300,000 in punitive damages from Energy Maintenance and Nesler indi-
222. Id.
223. Id. at 875.
224. Id. at 875–76.
225. Sandt v. Energy Maint. Servs. Grp. I, LLC, 534 S.W.3d 626, 633 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. filed).
226. Id. at 632.
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vidually.230 Importantly, Sandt and Energy Maintenance had entered into
a settlement agreement stipulating that Sandt would not seek recovery of
Nesler’s $300,000 from Energy Maintenance either “directly or
indirectly.”231
When Nesler sought indemnity from Energy Maintenance, the com-
pany denied his request and sought a declaratory judgment from the
court that it was not responsible for the judgment against Nesler.232 Fur-
ther, Energy Maintenance sought to revoke its indemnity agreement with
Nesler, arguing that the agreement was premised on Nesler’s mis-
characterization of his own actions, as proven by the jury’s finding of
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.233
In the alternative, Energy Maintenance argued that, pursuant to the
executed settlement agreement, Sandt could not collect the $300,000
judgment against Nesler if Energy Maintenance was required to indem-
nify Nesler.234
Both Energy Maintenance and Sandt appealed the trial court’s judg-
ment.235 Energy Maintenance argued that the trial court errantly deter-
mined Energy Maintenance was obligated to indemnify Nesler.236 Sandt
argued that the trial court mistakenly determined Sandt’s settlement
agreement with Energy Maintenance precluded Sandt from collecting its
judgment against Nelser.237
The court of appeals settled Energy Maintenance’s indemnity issue
based on Delaware law, holding that Energy Maintenance had the proper
authority and had indemnified Nesler when it entered into the agreement
with Nesler in 2005.238
However, Sandt’s issue regarding the effect of the settlement agree-
ment was properly considered under Texas law.239 The court sided with
Energy Maintenance.240 Energy Maintenance had agreed to indemnify
Nesler, and Sandt had agreed not to “directly or indirectly” collect dam-
ages from Energy Maintenance.241 Therefore, the court determined that
Sandt could not collect on its judgment against Nesler.242
The court paid particular attention to two provisions in the settlement
agreement: (1) Sandt’s release of Energy Maintenance and its officers
“from any and all claims, liabilities, actions, causes of action, demands,
damages, payments, reimbursements, remedies or relief of any kind or




234. Id. at 633–34.
235. Id. at 634.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 634–35.
238. Id. at 639.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 643.
241. Id.
242. Id.
350 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
nature”; and (2) Sandt’s promise that it would “not seek to execute and
w[ould] not accept recovery, in each case whether directly or indirectly,
against” Energy Maintenance for any additional liability in the suit.243
Finally, the court disposed of Sandt’s argument that the parties had not
intended to foreclose collection from Nelser by executing a joint motion
to release the appeal bond and an agreement to suspend enforcement of
the judgment pending Nesler’s appeal.244 The court held that the two doc-
uments were not admissible to contradict the settlement agreement be-
cause they were not annexed into the settlement agreement, which
contained an integration clause.245
The takeaway is simple: Texas courts will give full effect to an officer’s
indemnity agreement with his company even if strict adherence to that
indemnity agreement bars a third party’s recovery from the company.
Notably, officers and their companies will not always be absolved of lia-
bility when one of the two parties enters into a settlement agreement with
a third party, but if the settlement contains a provision excluding the third
party from “direct or indirect” collection against the company, an indem-
nity agreement between the company and the officer should protect both
parties from paying the other’s damages and, ultimately, from compensat-
ing the third party.
C. THE FIRST HOUSTON COURT OF APPEALS NARROWS “ALTER
EGO” THEORY AND “REVERSE VEIL PIERCING”
On October 24, 2017, the First Houston Court of Appeals held that a
corporate entity was not responsible for a non-shareholder’s liability
under the theory of reverse veil piercing.246
In NRMO Holdings, the court of appeals was tasked with determining
whether Appellees Anna Williams (Williams) and CD Homes (CD
Homes) were liable to NMRO Holdings, LLC (NMRO), under the theo-
ries of alter ego, partnership, joint enterprise, or conspiracy, for the debts
of Williams’s husband Robert Parker (Parker).247
Parker was the owner and operator of a residential construction com-
pany which had been sued and owed a $604,871 judgment to Finger Inter-
ests Number One, Ltd. (Finger Interests).248 Finger Interests assigned its
judgment against Parker to NMRO.249
In November 2005, Williams formed a company that facilitated auc-
tions for charities and non-profits called Profit for Non-Profits, LLC
(Profit for Non-Profits).250 Notably, Profit for Non-Profits was formed
243. Id. at 643.
244. Id. at 644.
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before Williams met Parker.251 One year later, after Williams and Parker
had met, Williams converted her company into a residential home build-
ing business and renamed the company CD Homes.252
In April 2007, Parker and his wife divorced.253 Seven months later, and
subject to a premarital agreement limiting Parker’s liabilities and obliga-
tions to his separate and personal property, Williams and Parker were
married.254
The suit arose from NMRO’s desire to hold Williams and CD Homes
liable for the judgment obtained against Parker and purchased from Fin-
ger Interests.255 NMRO’s amended petition alleged theories of liability
including alter ego, fraudulent transfer, conspiracy, partnership, and joint
enterprise.256
The trial court granted Williams and CD Homes’ motion for summary
judgment on all of NMRO’s claims.257 NMRO appealed the trial court’s
ruling.258
The court of appeals systematically affirmed the trial court’s ruling with
respect to each of NMRO’s theories of liability—most importantly, the
theory of alter ego.259 Generally, NMRO claimed that Williams and
Parker used CD Homes as a shell corporation to avoid paying Parker’s
judgment to NMRO, and as such, NMRO argued that the court should
have pierced the corporate veil in reverse, holding CD Homes liable for
Parker’s debts.260
The court of appeals cited appellate and supreme court precedent to
establish the test for corporate veil-piercing: “a plaintiff must show that
(1) the persons or entities on whom he seeks to impose liability are alter
egos of the debtor, and (2) that the corporate fiction was used for an
illegitimate purpose.”261 The court described “basic veil-piercing alter
ego principles [as] apply[ing] to reverse veil-piercing . . .” and that
“[u]nder a reverse-piercing theory, a creditor seeks . . . to hold a corpora-
tion’s assets accountable for the liability of individuals who treated the
corporation as their alter ego.”262 However, the court noted that reverse
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The court directly addressed two of NMRO’s arguments: first, that Wil-
liams changed the name of her business to CD Homes and the nature of
her business to residential real estate only after she met Parker.264 Sec-
ond, that even though Parker was not the owner of CD Homes, he was
the de facto owner because of his exercise of substantial decision-making
power and his management and control over the operations of CD
Homes.265
The court disposed of NMRO’s first argument, stating that “the act of
renaming a company is not tantamount to forming a new company . . .
[and] the transformation of Williams’s event planning business into a
homebuilding business does not change the undisputed fact that she is the
sole legal de jure owner of her company.”266
The court then disposed of NMRO’s second argument by distinguish-
ing the three cases NMRO cited as dealing with bankruptcies or applying
to shareholders.267 The court held that though some courts “have applied
veil piercing principles in exceptional circumstances to impose alter ego
liability on an individual shareholder . . . [they] have not recognized the
imposition of liability on a corporation for a judgment debt of a non-
shareholder unrelated to any corporate activity. We likewise decline to do
so here.”268
This court’s opinion is significant to the extent that it narrows, or at
least clarifies, the scope of a plaintiff’s ability to pierce the corporate veil.
The court was clear that individuals cannot be held responsible for the
wrongs of a corporation, and a corporation cannot be held responsible for
the wrongs of an individual that has no stake in the corporation. Direc-
tors and officers ought to consider this rule of law when evaluating their
own prospective liability, the liability of the companies they manage, and
their resultant inability to distribute a portion of the damages to another
individual.
D. THE FOURTEENTH HOUSTON COURT OF APPEALS REAFFIRMS THE
PROTECTIONS OF TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CODE SECTION 21.223.
On July 27, 2017, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that
the protections of Section 21.223 of the Texas Business Organizations
Code prevented Josephine Treurniet (Treurniet), the President of defen-
dant corporation TecLogistics, from being held individually liable for an
admitted fraud committed against plaintiff Dresser-Rand Group, Inc.
(Dresser-Rand).269
264. Id.
265. Id. at *4.
266. Id. at *3.
267. Id. at *4.
268. Id.
269. TecLogistics, Inc. v. Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc., 527 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
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The facts are relatively simple. Dresser-Rand routinely contracted with
TecLogistics for freight forwarding, and TecLogistics routinely subcon-
tracted with Pentagon Freight Services to complete the shipments.270
Dresser-Rand was billed for “passed-through charges” based on amounts
represented in Pentagon’s invoices.271
The pertinent issue arises from Dresser-Rand requesting and receiving
an invoice directly from Pentagon and discovering that TecLogistics had
created false invoices from Pentagon, overcharging Dresser-Rand
roughly $6,000.272 When questioned about the falsified invoices, TecLo-
gistics President, Treurniet, admitted that she had personally drafted the
false invoices.273
After the close of evidence, the trial court refused to submit Dresser-
Rand’s proposed jury question regarding Treurniet’s fraud-liability.274 On
that issue and others, both parties appealed.275
On the issue of Treurniet’s fraud, the court of appeals spent significant
effort analyzing the scope of Texas Business Organizations Code Section
21.223, which outlines a number of elements that must be proven in order
to hold a corporate shareholder or officer personally and individually lia-
ble.276 Subsection (a)(1)–(2) of the statute eliminates personal liability
for “holder[s] of shares, as owner[s] of any beneficial interest in shares, or
a subscriber for shares . . . or any affiliate [of the previous designa-
tions]”277 concerning corporate obligations or “matter[s] relating to or
arising from the obligation on the basis that the holder, beneficial owner,
subscriber, or affiliate is or was the alter ego of the corporation or on the
basis of actual or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or
other similar theory . . .”278 Importantly however, Subsection (a)(2)
does not prevent or limit the liability of a holder, beneficial owner,
subscriber, or affiliate if the obligee demonstrates that the [individ-
ual] caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrat-
ing and did perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for
the direct personal benefit of the [individual].279
First, the court of appeals held that Treurniet was not shielded from
liability by function of Subsection (a)(2) because: (1) Treurniet had a re-
lationship with TecLogistics, which was a corporation; (2) Treurniet was
both a “shareholder” and an “affiliate” because of her position as Presi-
dent; (3) Dresser-Rand’s fraud claim against Treurniet “relat[ed] to and
ar[ose] from” TecLogistics’s contractual obligations to Dresser-Rand; (4)
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Dresser-Rand was an “obligee” of TecLogistics; and (5) Dresser-Rand
was seeking to prove a claim against Treurniet for “actual fraud.”280
Next, the court turned its attention to Dresser-Rand’s alternative argu-
ment that the trial court should have found Treurniet liable for fraud de-
spite the statute’s terms by relying exclusively on the common law.281 The
court dispensed of this argument by citing Section 21.224,which provides
that liability “‘for an obligation that is limited by section 21.223 is exclu-
sive and preempts any other liability imposed for that obligation under
common law or otherwise.’”282
However, the court was not satisfied with its threadbare reliance on
Section 21.224.283 The court noted that its own disposition “does not ex-
plain why, at first blush, many cases—a number of which are cited by
Dresser-Rand—appear to hold an individual liable with respect to a mat-
ter relating to or arising from a corporate obligation even when the re-
quirements of section 21.223(a)(2) have been satisfied.”284 To explain
those inconsistencies, the court turned to the statute’s history.285
The court clarified that before 1993, the statute “did not expressly pre-
empt the common law”286 and it was “not until 1997 that the statute
reached its current breadth.”287 In 1997, the statute was amended to pro-
tect not only shareholders, subscribers, and beneficial interest owners,
but also “any affiliate thereof or of the corporation.”288 The court aptly
noted that “[w]ith this change, the statute began to shield those with the
right to control the corporation, even if they had no actual or beneficial
ownership interest.”289 Remarkably, this included officers and directors.
Finally, the court turned its attention to Section 21.223(b), reasoning
that Treurniet could still be liable if she “‘caused the corporation to be
used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual fraud
on the oblige primarily for [her] direct personal benefit.’”290 The court
concluded that because Dresser-Rand did not adequately plead
Treurniet’s motivations, the court could not find Treurniet liable pursuant
to Section 21.223(b).291
As such, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals concluded that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to submit a jury ques-
tion about Treurniet’s personal liability to Dresser-Rand for fraud.292
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The court’s holding in TecLogistics is most significant for clarifying the
scope of protection under Section 21.223(a) of the Texas Business Orga-
nizations Code and for its exhaustive recounting of the statute’s develop-
ment, which reaffirms the statute’s protections in the face of seemingly
contradictory case law. And still, the court’s determination that officers—
non-shareholders—are properly considered “affiliates” is an important
interpretation for director and officer liability jurisprudence.
